Inflation and stabilization in Yugoslavia by Rocha, Roberto de Rezende










Roberto  de Rezende  Rocha
A successful stabilization program in Yugoslavia requires more
political resolve about wage indiscipline and loss-making enter-
prises than was observed in 1990.  But the ultimate question is
whether stabilization can  succeed  without a  comprehenisive
privatization program.
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Rocha exarnines the main reasons inflation  was initially successful in fighting inflation. But
accelerated in Yugoslavia in the 1980s and  it became clear in the course of the program that
reviews past and current attempts at stabilization.  other losses had not been removed.  Pressures to
finance enterprises and avoid a liquidity crisis in
He shows that inflation in Yugoslavia shares  the financial system resulted in a relaxation of
common elements with inflation in other highly  monetary policy in mid- 1990 and a revival of
indebted countries, despite appearances other-  inilationary pressures.  Attempts to reimpose
wise. These common elements include a large  monetary control met considerable difficulty at
transfer of resources abroad unmatched by an  the end of tlhe  year, includinlg  a bizarre episode
internai adjustment, resulting in a large internal  of expansion of central bank credits without the
redistribution of real resources through inflation.  board of governors'  approval.
Yugoslavia differs from other countries in  It also became clear that the fiscal compo-
that these internal conditions are not transparent.  nent was not consistent with other elements of
Instead of an open fiscal deficit, there were  the program.  It was clearly not enough to
complex interactions among enterprises, com-  finance a social program of the magnitude
mercial banks, and the central bank, involving,  required had loss-making enterprises really been
among otner things, the absorption and servicing  lorced into bankruptcy and also to cover the
of a large stock of foreign exchange liabilities by  needs of the bank restructuring program.  Seen
the central bank.  from this angle, the Yugoslav program of 1990
resembles other heterodox programs that had
Other factors contributed to the sharp  initial success in reducing inflation but later
acceleration of inflation at the end of the eighties  faltered because of the insufficiency of the fiscal
- especially a large real devaluation in mid-  adjustment.
1988, when an indexed economy drove inflation
to a much higher level.  In 1989, a preemptive  At the same time, the events in the second
explosion of real wages added fuel to inflation's  half of' 1990 also indicate that, for a stabilization
fire.  program to succeed in Yugoslavia, there must be
much greater political resolve to cope with wage
Rocha argues that the failure to correct  indiscipline and loss-making enterprises than
hidden losses in the economy was the main  was observed in 1990.  And the question
reason various stabilization attempts failed in the  remains whether financial discipline can be
1980s.  The 1990 program was the first to  imposed in the system only at the macroeco-
recognize the existence of those hidden losses  nomic level and without introducing private
and the need for fiscal correction - although it  ownership of capital.  The ultimate question may
also introduced other elements to cope with  be whetlher  stabilization can succeed without a
inflationary inertia.  The program succeeded in  comprehlensive  privatization program.
eliminating the central bank's own deficit and
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1.  Introduction.
The  reversal  of  external  financing  flows  during  the  19808  forced  Yugoslavia
to undertake  drastic  measures  to balance  its  external  accounts. The external
adjustment  consisted  primarily  of large  real exchange  rate devaluations  and,
initially,  quantitative  restrictions  on imports. Although  these  measures  were
able to  generate increasing  current account surpluses, economic activity
stagnated  and  inflation  accelerated  almost  continuously  (figure  1  and  table  1).
Moreover, the absence of fiscal imbalances  in the economy (figure  1) might
suggest  that the  nature  of inflation  in  Yugoslavia  is  entirely  non fiscal.
Table  1
Annual  Rates  of Inflation  (CPI)  in  Yugoslavia,  1980-90
(in  S)
80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90
Dec.  37  36  33  60  53  75  92  169  245  2685  120
Aver.  31  39  31  40  54  72  90  120  194  1240  588
Sources  IFS
While  it  is  true  that  many  hyperinflation  episodes  are  triggered  by  balance
of payments  difficulties  and large exchange  rate devaluations,  the complete
absence  of  fiscal  imbalances  from  the  overall  picture  in the  case  of  Yugoslavia
is intriguing.  Indeed, even the "balance  of payments  view of inflation"
recognizes  the role of fiscal deficits  in the determination  of inflation,
although  such  a  role is assumed  to  be less  central  than  under  the "fiscal  view
of  inflation".  In  the  former,  the  exchange  rate  assumes  the  central  role,  while
fiscal  deficits  contribute  to inflation  mostly  through  endogenous  interactions
with the  exchange  rate  and  the  inflation  rate  itself  (Dornbusch  1987;  Dornbusch
and  Fischer  1986;  Liviatan  and  Piterman  1986;  and  Montiel  1989).Figure 1
Selected  Macroeconomic  Variables  For Yugoslavia,  1977-89
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The  paper  shows  that  the  acceleration  of  inflation  in  Yugoslavia  after  1982
resembles  in  part  the  phenomenon  of inflation  in  other  high  indebted  countries,
despite  initial  appearances. The resemblance  lies on three common  elements.
The first  is the adverse  impact  that large  real devaluations  had on the  major
holders  of foreign  liabilities--in  the  case  of Yugoslavia,  the  enterprises  and
the central  bant:.  The second  element  was the lack of internal  adjustment  by
enterprises  or  the  public  sector  to  match  the  large  transfer  of  resources  abroad.
Instead,  enterprise  losses  increased  through  the 1980s,  partly  as a result  of
the  real  devaluations  and  increasing  problems  of  overstaffing.  The  third  element
was the  internal  generation  of resources  through  inflation.
Inflation  in  Yugoslavia  seems  to differ  from  this rather  familiar  story
due to the lack.of transparency  of internal  conditions. Instead  of an open
fiscal  deficit,  there  were  complex  interactions  between  enterprises,  commercial
banks  and the  central  bank,  involving,  among  other  things,  the  assamption  of a
share of debt service payments  by the latter.  The situation  was further
complicated  by the  existence  of  a large  stock  of  foreign  exchange  deposits  held
by residents  in  t0-  domestic  financial  system. The central  bank also  absorbed
these  deposits  in order  to protect  the enterprises  and commercial  banks from
greater  financial  difficulties,  thus  increasing  further  the  level  of its  quasi-
fiscal  expenditures.
While the financing  of hidden  losses  was a permanent  source  of monetary
expansion and  inflation through the  1980s, the paper also  assesses the
contribution  of  non-fiscal  factors  to  the  sharp  acceleration  of inflation  at  the
very  end  of  the  decade--the  rate  of  inflation  increased  more  than  tenfold  between
mid-1988  and end-1989. More specifically,  the  paper  assesses  the impact  of a
large  real  devaluation  in  mid-1988  in  the  context  of  an  indexed  economy,  and  also
the  impact of  an  explosion of  real wages  in  the period preceding the
stabilization  program  of 1990.  The paper  presents  some econometric  evidence
indicating  that these factors  became  indeed  more important  at the end of the5
decade. 1
Finally,  the paper  reviews  the  performance  of stabilization  programs  in
Yugoslavia,  and  assesses  the  perspectives  of  the  stabilization  program  of  January
1990,  the  first  program  that  recognizes  the  existence  of  hidden  losses  in  the
economy  and  the  need  for  a  fiscal  correction.
The  paper is organized  as follows. The second  section  examines  the
contribution  of "fundamentals"  to the acceleration  of inflation  in the 1980s.
It  examines  the  links  between  enterprises'  financial  imbalances,  central  bank
deficits,  and  inflationary  finance.  The  third  section  analyzes  the  relationship
between  exchange  rates,  wages  and  prices  during  the  1980s,  paying  particular
attention  to  the  two  last  years  of  the  decade,  when  inflation  accelerated  very
rapidly.  The  fourth  section  examines  past  and  present  attempts  at  stabilization,
with focus  on  the 1990  program.  Finaily,  the fifth  section  draws some
conclusions.
2. Enterprise  Losses.  Central  Bank  Deficits  and  Inflation.
Other  studies  provide  a  detailed  examination  of  the  causes  A e.fterprises'
losses,  and  their  distribution  inside  Yugoslavia  (Knight  1984;  Konovalov  1989;
and  Saldanha  1989).  For  the purposes  of this  paper  highlighting  the  main
findings  of  these  studies  is  sufficient.  Excessive  personnel  and  the  setting
of wages  by criteria  completely  divorced  from  productivity  stand  out  as  one of
the  major  causes  behind  poor  financial  performance.  Other  X-inefficiencies  in
the  use  of  material  inputs  are  also  a  major  cause 2. The  losses  also  reflect
investment  decisions  made  at  very  distorted  relative  prices  and  without  any
serious  consideration  about  potential  demand. These  investments  were  undertaken
mostly  during  the  1960s  and  19709,  and  financed  in  good  part  by  foreign  credits.
I  See  Rocha  (1989),  for  an  analysis  of  the  role  played  by the  finaLacial
system  in  the  Yugoslav  inflation,  Bole  and  Gaspari  (1990)  for  a  detailed  analysis
of  policy  regimes  during  the  1980s,  and  the  earlier  studies  of  Mates  (1987),
Hencinger  (1987)  and  Gaspari  (1988).
2  For  instance,  Konovalov  (1989)  reports  that  energy  requirements  per  unit
of  output  were  twice  as  high  as  in  western  enterprises.6
Finally,  the  distorted  tax system  which  prevailed  in Yugoslavia  was also aS a
cause of  enterprise losses.  For  one, excessive payroll taxes increased
significantly  the cost of labor to the enterprises.  Also, the base of the
enterprise  Income  tax  was defined  as  the  income  before  the  payment  of  wages,  and
enterprises  paid income  taxes  even if  they  generated  net losses.
As  shown  in table  2, enterprise  losses  increased  from  around  2.0  percent
of Gross  Social  Product  (GSP)  in  the  early  1980s,  to  approximately  6 percent  of
GSP  in 1987-88  and  15  percent  of GSP  in 1989. These  numbers  are  not indicative
of cash losses,  since  they include  non-cash  expenditures  such  as depreciation,
and  revaluation  of stock  items. In  addition,  they  are  also  affected  by frequent
changes  in  accounting  rules, including  the adoption of inflation-adjusted
accounting  in 1987. However,  they  indicate  a  deteriorating  trend  that  's  highly
probable.
Table  2
Enterprise  Losses  as Shares  of  GSP, 1981-88
1981-84  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
2.1  2.8  3.0  6.6  5.7  15.0
Sources  Social  Accounting  Office.
The  real  exchange  rate  devaluations  of  the 1980.  were one  likely  cause  of
the increase  in enterprise  losses  shown  in table  2.  These  real devaluations
increased  not  only  the  real  domestic  cost  of  imported  inputs,  but  also  the  real
flows  of interest  payments  on Yugoslavia's  external  debt,  80 percent  of  which
was initially  held by enterprises  (the  remaining  20 percent  with the central
bank). 3 Another  major  cause  of increased  enterprise  losses  is likely  to have
been  the  increasing  problem  of overstaffing  observed  during  this  period. While
GSP growth  rates declined  from 7 percent  in the 19709  to 0.7 percent  in the
1980s,  the  rates  of  unemployment  increased  very  slightly  between  the  two  decades-
3 The  full impact  of real  devaluations  on interest  pAvments  was, however,
reduced  by the  transfer  of some  debt service  payments  to the  central  bank.7
-from  12 to less than 14  percent. As a  result,  the amount  of excess  labor  in
Yugoslav  enterprises  is  estimated  to  have increased  to 20 percent  of the labor
force at the and of the 1980s (Mencinger  1989).  The lack of adjustment  of
Yugoslav  enterprises  is  further  illustrated  in  figure  2,  which  shows  the  absence
of a  relationship  between  changes  in  the  rate  of  unexLloyment  and  output  growth
rates (the  Okun's  law) in  Yugoslavia,  in contrast  with the  US and  German  cases
(see  Gordon  1984;  Okun 1970)4.
Finally,  changes  in  the  tax  structure  during  the  1980s  had  a  very adverse
impact  on enterprises,  since  they amounted  to a shift from indirect  taxes  to
heavier  payroll  and enterprise  income  taxes--the  share  of these two taxes  in
total  tax  revenues  increased  from  50 to  67 percent  between  1983  and 19&9  (Ding
1990  and  Mates 1991). Thus,  these  changes  increased  the  costs  of excess  lab"r
in Yugoslav  enterprises.
The  existence  of  enterprise  losses  raises  the  question  of how  these  losses
were financed.  During  the  1980s  there  were  two  basic  sources  of financing.  The
first  comprised  various  forms  of  inter-enterprise  financing,  including  voluntary
transfers  from  profit  makers  to loss  makers  inside  the  same  industraal  holding,
and forced transfers  under various forms--para-fiscal  transfers and inter-
enterprise  credits  and  arrears. The  second  source  of financing  complrised  bank
credits  at subsidized  terms. Of course,  the  fact  that  the  enterprise-controlled
banks  maintained  the  policy  of  credit  subsidies  was  only  sustained  by  the  payment
of even more negative  real interest  rates on domestic  deposits (figure  3)5.
Note  that  only  at  the  end  of  the  decade  real  interest  rates  became  positive,  due
to the  indexation  of time  deposits  of three  months  and  abovs. The  consequences
of this  measure  are examined  in section  4.
4  Figure  3  shows  simple  OLS  regression  lines  for  the  1975-88  period  for  the
three  countries.
5  Figure  3  show  the  monthly  averages  of realized  real  rates  on  one  year  time
deposits,  computed  by  rt  =  (1  +  it)/(l  +  at+,),  where  r  and  it are  the  real  and
nominal  interest  rates  at t and  lrt+l  the inflation  rate  between  t and t+1.Figure  2
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While the  provision  of bank  credits  at subsidized  terms  was instrumental
in financing  enterprises'  imbalances,  the  stock  of bank  credits  would  not have
grown at high rates  without a commensurate  rate of monetary  expansion,  most
particularly  of base  money.  Therefore,  an examination  of the  primary  sources
of base  money  creation  is in  order.
The rapid  expansion  of base money  during  the  19809  diu  not result  from
direct  financing  of  enterprise  losses  by  the  central  bank. However,  it  resulted
in great part from the central  bank's attempts  to protect enterprises  and
commercial  banks from  even greater  financial  problems. First,  after 1982  the
central bank  increased the  provision of  selective rediscounts (exports,
agriculture,  equipment,  etc.)  at  very  subsidized  terms. Second,  the  central  bank
absorbed  and serviced  a large  volume  of foreign  liabilities  previously  held  by
the  enterprises  and  O.1  banks.
More  specifically,  after  1982  several  enterprises  experienced  difficulties
in servicing  their  foreign  liabilities.  As a result,  the  central  bank assumed
a share  of enterprises'  foreign  liabilities,  mostly  of those  located  in less10
developed  regions.  Second,  the  central  bank  aloo  absorbed  and  serviced  the  whole
stock of foreign exchange  (FX) deposits  in the commercial  banke.  These IX
deposits  are  held  mostly  by  residents,  are  not  part  of  Yugoslavia's  external  debt
(table 3),  and  accounted for two  thirds of  the  central bank's foreign
liabilities.
Table  3
External  Debt  and  FX Deposits,  1980-89
(In  % of  GSP)
1981  1983  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
External  Debt  30.0  32.1  44.1  33.0  30.7  32.1  25.0
FX Deposits  12.5  13.3  19.1  17.5  17.5  17.8  17.4
Sources  National  Bank  of Yugoslavia.
The  absorption  of  the  stock  was  done  through  the  introduction  of  a  foreign
exchange  insurance  scheme  that involved  the transfer  of FX deposits  to the
central  bank  in exchange  for  an  equivalent  amount  of low  interest  Dinar  credits
from  the  central  bank. The  purpose  of the  scheme  was to  shield  commercial  banks
against foreign exchange  losses,  while also allowing  them to keep granting
subsidized  credits  to enterprises.
The  fact  that  the  central  bank  started  servicing  a  large  volume  of foreigr.
liabili.zies  while charging  negative  real interest  rates on all its credits
generated  a  quasi-fiscal  deficit  that  constituted  an  important  source  of  monetary
expansion.  This problem can be examined  in more detail  by considering  the
summarized  balance  sheet  identity  of the  central  bank in first  differences:
C  - H  +  NFL  +  NW  (1)
Where  C - central  bank  credits,  H - base  money (currency  plus  reserves),
NFL  =  net  foreign  liabilities  of the  central  bank  and  NW  - the  net  worth of  the
central  bank.  The  dots indicate  time  derivatives. Note that  the  central  bank
does  not  lend  to the  non-financial  public  sector. Note  also  that  the  variations11
In  net  foreign  liabilities  include  a  variation  in  foreign  currency  and  a  capital
loss  terms
whL  - NiL*S +  NFL*E  (2)
Where  the  star  superscript  denotes  a  foreign  exchange-denominated  variable.
The  variations  in  the  central  banks'  net  worth  are  determined  by  the  combination
of its income  statement  and  revaluation  accounts
NW  - i  C - (i +  E)NFL  E  - irR  (3)
Where i., and ir are the interest  rates  on credits  and bank reserves,
respectively.  The  interest rate  on  all  foreign-denominated  assets and
liabilities  are  assumed  equal  to  i  for  simplicity.  The  hats  indicate  percentage
changes 6. The  interest  revenues  or  expenditures  of  foreign-denominated  variables
are adjusted  for  the exchange  rate  depreciation. They can actually  be broken
down  between  a  cash  and  a capital  loss  terms7.
Combining  equations  (1) and (3)  and solving  for the  variations  in base
money  yields:
H-  C  - NFL*E  - icC  +  i*NFL*E +  irR  (4)
Equation (4) indicates  that base money is expanded  when there is an
increase  in domestic  credits  or a decrease  in net  foreign  liabilities,  or  when
the central  bank runs an excess  of interest  expenditures  over revenues. Note
that the capital gain/loss  terms in equations (2) and (3) cancel out.  A
depreciation  generates  a capital  loss  on the stock  of net foreign  liabilities
but  has  no immediate  impact  on  base  money  creation. However,  the  capital  loss
is eventually  realized  through  interest  payments  or a decrease  in the  stock.
6  .
E  - El/..
7  A
(i  + E)NFL*E  - i*NFL*E  +  NFL  E, where the first  term is the  central
bank's  cash  expenditures  and  the  second  the  capital  loss  on the  stock  resulting
from  the  depreciations.12
A  much  better  insight  can  be gained  by  stating  equation  (4)  in  real  terms,
since  the issue  of real resource  transfers  becomes  much  more clear.  Dividing
both sides  of the equation  by the domestic  price levelp  P, and the foreign-
denominated  stocks  by the international  price level,  P  *, and splitting  the
nominal  interest  rates  between  the real  rate and  the inflation  premium,
i  - r +  f,  where  r is  the  associated  real  rate  and  x  the  rate  of inflation,  one
obtains:
Hi/P  irR/P  cnfl*e  - (rcc  - r*nfl*e)  (5)
Where the  lowercase  letter  indicate  real  stocks 8. The  term  on the  left is the
net  seignorage  revenules  collected by  the central bank, defined as gross
seignorage  minus the payment  of interests  on banks'  reserves. The fact that
the real interest  rate charged  on domestic  credits,  rc,  was always  negative,
while  the  real  cost  of  foreign  liabilities,  r*,  was  positive,  implied  a  transfer
of  seignorage  to  the  recipients  of  subsidized  credits  and  the  holders  of  foreign
liabilities. Such  transfer  can  be  verified  by two  alternative  ways.  First,  by
examining  the  balance  sheet  of the central  bank in real terms  and, second,  by
estimating  the  terms  on the  right  hand side  of equation  (5).
Consider  first  the real balance  sheet  of the central  bank in figure  4.
After  1982  the  real  stock  of  credits  fell  much  faster  than  the  real  stock  of  base
money.  The decline  in  real  base  money  reflects  the  decline  in the  real  demand
for  financial  assets,  while  the  decline  in  real  credits  reflects  not only  this
factor,  but also  two additional  factors,  namely,  the loss  associated  with the
real interest  flows  and  the  net repayments  of foreign  liabilities. This point
can be clarified  further  by rearranging  equation  (5)  and splitting  seignorage
between  the  inflation  tax,  fh,  and the  real  changes  in  the  stock,  hs
h  +  nfl*e  +  (r  c - r nfl  e)  +  irh  (6)
Where the interests  on reserves  are disregarded  for  simplicity. Equation  (6)
8
x  - l/P.  Note also  that  X/P  - x  +  ¢x13
ehowe  that real  credits  grow less than the  real stock  of base money  when net
foreign  liabilities  decrease  or  when the  real interest  flows  are  negative,  and
grow  more than  real  base  money  the  larger  the  revenues  from  the inflation  tax.
Of course,  the  two  last  terms  capture  the  changes  in the  real  net  worth  of the
central  bank. The  inflation  tax  is  a real  source  of  revenue  to  the  central  bank
and increases  its  real  net  worth,  while the real interest  losses  decrease  it.
When the  inflation  tax is  smaller  (larger)  than  the  real interest  losses  there
is  a  decrease  (increase)  in the  real  net  worth. A  decrease  in  the  real  net  worth
will be reflected  in a decline  of real  credits  relative  to base  money,  unless
there is an increase in net foreign liabilities.  If the real net worth
increases,  but  the  if  the  inflation  tax  is  also  used  to  finance  the  net  repayment
of foreign  liabilities  or the purchase  of foreign  assets,  real credits  also
decline  relative  to  base  money.
Figure  4
Balance  Sheet  of  the  Central  Bank
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From  a different  angle,  if the  central  bank  makes  large  net  purchases  of
foreign  exchange  from  enterprises  in the  tradables  sector  in order  to service
its foreign  liabilities  (interest  and  principal)  or accumulate  foreign  assets,14
it is clear that credits will grow less than base  money.  Moreover,  if the
central  bank  forgoes  interest  revenues  by  charging  highly  negative  real  interest
rates  on its credits,  that imposes  an additional  burden  on its finances. The
smaller  the  flow  of  revenues  the  higher  has  to  be the  rate  of  monetary  expansion
in  order  to achieve  a certain  credit  target  or to finance  other  operations.
That  was  essentially  the  situation  faced  by the  central  bank  of  Yugoslavia
during  the  1980s,  although  the  dominant  factors  varied  from  year  to  year. During
the mid-1980s the inflation tax was primarily  used to finance the credit
subsidies  and the real interests  on foreign  liabilities,  although  the  central
bank also financed  the net repayments  of its  foreign  liabilities. Note that
during  this  period  its  real  net  worth  declined. In 1988  and 1989  the  decrease
in  net foreign  liabilities  dominated  the  process  of  money  creation. Note that
in these  last  two  years  the  real  net  worth  increased 9.
Table  4  provides  further  information  on  the  quasi-fiscal  operations  of  the
central  bank.  The first  section  of the table  shows  gross and  net seignorage
(gross  seignorage  was measured  by yearly  changes  in the  nominal  stock  of base
money). The  second  section  distributes  seignorage  among  the  three  major  sources
of  money  expansion:  the  selective  credits,  the  foreign  exchange  insurance  scheme
and  the  central  bank's  operations  with the  external  sector. Each  row  shows  the
yearly  changes  in  the stocks  minus  or  plus the  interest  flows  on the  stocks 10.
The figures  are  expressed  as shares  of GSP  and are  estimates,  calculated  from
9 In figure  4, credits  and  base  money  were divided  by the  December  CPIs,
based  in  December  1980,  while  the  foreign  liabilities  were  converted  into  German
Marks (the  dominant  currency)  at the  cross-currency  rates  of December  1980  and
multiplied  by the  Dinar/German  Mark rate  of  December  1980.  The  real  net  worth
was calculated  as a residual. This  procedure  is  consistent  with equation  (5),
and allows  one  to track  the  evolution  of real  foreign  liabilities  and  the  real
net  worth  net of the  impact  of the  real  devaluations  of the  Dinar.  If the  net
foreign  liabilities  had  been simply  divided  by the  price  leval,  their  increase
in 1983  would have been more pronounced,  and the decline  in real net worth
stronger.
10  For  instance,  in  the  case  of  selective  credits  the  table  show  the  changes
in selective  credits  minus  the  interest  revenues  on these  credits,  c - rcca
A  similar  procedure  is applied  in the  case of the  FX insurance  scheme  and  the
operations  with the  external  sector.15
information  on  the stocks  and interest  rates.  A  detailed  description  of the
methodology  used is  provided  in Rocha  (1989).
Table  4
Seignorage  Revenues  on Base  Money,  1981-88
(in  X  of GSP)
1980-84  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Gross  Seignorage  2.7  3.6  4.2  4.9  5.5  12.1
Interests  on Reserves  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  1.0
Net Seignorage  2.6  3.5  4.1  4.8  5.4  11.1
Selective  Credits  n.a  231  121  581  141  23X
FX  Insurance  Scheme  n.a  501  451  50S  261  211
Net  Liabilities  with RoW  n.a  27X  43%  -81  60%  56X
Source:  National  Bank of  Yugoslavia.
Table  4 shows  that  net  seignorage  increased  through  the  19809  to reach  11
percent  of GSP in 1989. Regarding  the  main sources  of monetary  expansion,  the
table  also indicates  the  existence  of two distinct  periods.  During  the  first
period (1985-87)  the quasi-fiscal  operations  of the central bank were the
dominant  source  of  monetary  expansion,  with  the  foreign  exchange  insurance  scheme
absorbing  roughly  50 percent  of seignorage. During  the second  period  (1988-
89),  there  was  an  effort  to  increase  interest  rates  on  domestic  credits  to  levels
closer  to inflation.  During  this period,  the large  accumulation  of foreign
assets  (a  decrease  in  net  foreign  liabilities)  became  the  dominant  source  of  base
money  creation. Thus,  a large  share  of seignorage  revenues  was  used  to finance
the build-up of foreign reserves that preceded the stabilization  program.
However,  the  volume  of resources  channelled  to finance  quasi-fiscal  operations
was also significant,  especially  in 1989,  when it reached  more than 4 percent
of GSP. 1
Although  the above analysis  shows that central  bank deficits  were an
11  These  estimates  are  based  on data  on stocks  and  interest  rates  and  are
subject  to some  measurement  errors. Thus,  the  objective  of the  exercise  is to
provide information  on trends and orders of magnitude.  Nevertheless,  the
findings  are broadly in line  with those  provided  by other authors (Bole  and
Gaspari  1990 and  Mates 1991),  which also show the increasing  burden  of real
interest  payments  in 1985-87,  followed  by a  period  (1988-89)  where  the  decrease
in  net foreign  liabilities  dominated  the  process  of  money  creation.16
important source of monetary expansion and inflation, it  might also suggest that
these deficits were only indirectly related to enterprise imbalances, and that
the link between domestic imbalances and inflationary finance was limited to
central  bank operations.  However, the  whole volume of inflationary taxation  was
not limited to the collection of seignorage on base money.  Since commercial
banks paid negative real interest rates on all deposits through most of the
1980s, the total volume was much  larger than that collected  from base money
alone.  This  point  must  be  stressed,  since  it  brings  to  the  fore  the
distributional aspect of inflation in  Yugoslavia, particularly the distribution
of real resources from holders of Dinar assets towards enterprises.  Indeed, the
subsidies on domestic credits helped enterprises  bear the burden of the external
transfer and kept a large number of loss making enterprises afloat during the
1980s.  Furthermore, the dependency of these  enterprises on subsidized financing
has always been a serious obstacle to successful stabilization in Yugoslavia.
An  accurate  calculation of  the total resource transfers would  require
detailed information on interest rates and the maturity breakdown of domestic
deposits and credits.  The absence of critical pieces of information precludes
the  conduct  of  such  exercise.  However,  the  potential  size  of  seignorage
collected by the consolidated financial system can be appreciated by comparing
the relative magnitudes of gross seignorage on base money and MI in table 5.12
Table 5
Gross Seignorage on Base Money and Ml, 1980-89
(In  % of GSP)
1980-84  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Base Money  2.7  3.6  4.2  4.9  5.5  12.1
Ml  4.8  5.0  9.1  7.7  11.0  24.5
Sources:  National  Bank  of  Yugoslavia  and  International Financial  Statistics.
12 Measured by yearly changes in the respective stocks, as shares of GSP.17
Although these numbers may seem excessive, particularly in 1989, one has
to consider a  number of factors.  First,  although the shift  out of domestic  money
was considerable (figure 5), the continuous increase in seignorage reflects in
part  ongoing  portfolio  adjustment  to  an  inflation  that  also  accelerated
continuously.  Second, two factors contributed to  the unusually large seignorage
revenues in 1989.  For one, the very high inflation in 1989  was to some extent
unexpected.  Also, there was an unusually large expansion of credits and base
money in  December of that year.  Finally, in the case of M1 one has to consider
the fact that enterprises were also taxed, since they also held deposits.  Thus,
although they  were the  main beneficiaries from the inflationary transfers, their
net gains were smaller than indicated in table 5.
Figure 5
Real  M2,  FX  Deposits  and  M3
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3. Exchange Rate. Wages and Prices.
The  simultaneous occurrence  of  large real  devaluations  and increasing
inflation raise the  question  of  whether there  were other channels  of transmission
of such exchange rate shocks.  One popular model of inflation focuses on the18
combination  of  real  exchange  rate  targets,  rigid  real  wages  and  monetary
accommodation.  It is actually a variant of a broad class of distributional
conflict models of inflation and has been labeled the Pazos-Simonsen mechanism
(e.g.  Dornbusch 1986;  Dornbusch and Simonsen 1987;  and  Pazos 1978).  It is  useful
to review a basic version  of the model  in order to assess  its relevance to
Yugoslavia.  To this end, assume that prices are determined by a mark-up over
costs, including labor  costs and the  costs  of intermediate inputs,  as in  equation
(7):
Pt  =  aLWt  +  aMEtPMt  (7)
Where  P is the price  level, W  is the nominal wage, E  is the nominal
exchange rate, PM* is the foreign price of the imported intermediate input, aL
and aM are the  unit labor and intermediate goods requirements, respectively, and
the subscript t is the time period.  The mark-up  is set equal  to zero for
simplicity.  The real exchange rate is defined by:
et  =  EtPt*IPt  (8) et  t t  t(8
Where e is the real exchange rate and P  is the foreign currency price of
the good competing with the country's exports in world markets.  Substituting
(8) into (7) and assuming that all international prices are equal to unity, a
relationship between the real wage, w, and the real exchange rate is obtained:
wt=  Wt/Pt  =  I/aL  - (am/aL)et  (9)
Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between the real exchange rate and
the real wage  in Yugoslavia 13. Note the two periods when there was  a clear
effort to maintain the real exchange rate at a targeted level: 1983 to  mid-1986
and 1988 to mid-1989.  In  1986-87 the real exchange  rate target was  partly
abandoned and real wages were  allowed to increase.  The same happened in the
13  The real exchange rate was measured by a simple basket of two real,
bilateral exchange rates (the Dinar/US$ and the Dinar/DM) with equal weights.
The average real  wage was measured by the  average  nominal personal income divided
by the CPI.19
second  half  of 1989. However,  also  note  that  even  in  these  periods  the  real  wage
was usually  below  the  levels  of the  1970s.
Figure  6
Rea  I  Exchange  Rate  and  Rea I  Wages
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Of course,  one  has to bear in  mind that  unit labor  costs  decreased  much
less  than  real  wages. For  one,  the  overall  decline  in  labor  productivity  offset
in part  the fall  in real  wages.  Also,  the  imposition  of heavier  payroll  taxes
and other  enterprise  taxes  also tended  to increase  unit labor  costs.  In the
enterprises  where  the  problem  of excess  labor  was  more severe,  unit labor  costs
incltding  taxes  actually  increased. Nevertheless,  the figure  does reveal  the
effort  to drive  down  real  wages  and  enforce  a  real  devaluation.
The question  is how the  observed  decrease  in the  real  wage was obtained
in Yugoslavia. The Pazos-Simonsen  mechanism  postulates  that,  under real  wage
rigidity,  it takes  an increase  in inflation  to engineer  a decline  in the real20
wage. To  understand  this  mechanism,  assume  that  the  adjustment  of  nominal  wages
follows  the rule  Wt - cPt 1 1, that  is,  a backward  indexation  formula. Clearly,
the parameter  C  is the  peak  real  wage, that is, the level of the  real wage
immediately  after  the  adjustment,  while the  effective  real  wage is  wt - Wt/Pt.
It  is  easy  to note  that  the  extent  to  which  the  effective  real  wage falls  below
the  peak  depends  on the  rate  of inflation  between  t-l  and  t.  The relationship
between  the  real  exchange  rate  and  the  rate  of  inflation,  ITt,  follows  by  a  simple
substitutions
c
wt  - _  . 1/aL  - (aM/aL)et  (10)
The relevance  of the Papoe-Simoneen  mechanism  for  the Yugoslav  case can
be assessed  by examining  the  rules  governing  the  adjustment  of nominal  wages  in
the  1980s. The  basic  principle  that  was followed  in  Yugoslavia  in  the  1980s  was
the  principle  of  relative  performance.  Any  enterprise  was  allowed  to  pay  higher
than average  wages if it could  demonstrate  that it  had achieved  a  better  than
average  performance.  This principle was  formulated  as an attempt  to avoid
excessive  wage payments  and  was  made operational  through  a formula  of "business
performance" (Konovalov 1989; Saldanha 1989; and  Vodopive,c  1989).  The
implications  of this principle  for the short-run  behavior  of real wages  are
unclear,  since  there  were  no  explicit  rules  for  wage  adjustments  within  the  year.
In 1987, however, the government  introduced  an explicit formula for
adjustments  within  the  year. It  divided  total  wage  payments  for  each  enterprise
between  two parts.  The first  part  was considered  as a basic labor  cost,  and
subject  to  periodic  adjustments  within  the  year. The  second  part  was determined
by the relative  performance  of the  enterprise,  as discussed  above.  The first
part  was defined  as 80 percent  of enterprises'  net operating  income  (revenues
minus  non-labor  costs)  in  the  previous  year,  adjusted  for  increases  in  the  cost
of living--a  wage indexation  rule.14
14  Bole  and  Gaspari  (1990)  also  indicate  that  indexation  became  widespread
after  1987.21
The  impact  of  the  introduction  of  wage indexation  in 1987  may be examined
by inspecting  the dynamic  properties  of the rate of inflation.  Rewriting
equation  (7),  (8)  and the  backward  indexation  rule in terms  of growth  ratess
fft  *  aLWt  +  ,MEt  (11)
Et  f  ft  +  et  (12)
Wt  "t-l  (13)
Where aL is the share  of labor in total  costs (fL  + aM - 1),  the hate
indicate  percentage  changes and the foreign  prices are again assumed to be
constant  for  simplicity.  If the  nominal  exchange  rate  is  adjusted  according  to
purchasing  power  parity,  it follows  thats
lft  it- 1 (14)
Therefore,  under  these  conditions  the  inflation  process  is  fully  inertial.
Of course,  this  crude  version  of the  model  assumes  implicitly  the  existence  of
monetary  accommodation.  Indeed,  the  specification  of the  aggregate  demand  and
the  central  bank's  reaction  function  indicate  that  full  inertia  only  results  if
there  is  also  full  monetary  accommodation  by the  central  bank (Cardoso  1981  and
1983;  Barbosa  and  McNellis  1989;  and  Barbosa  and  Vale 1989).15
To examine  whether the data supports  the hypothesis  of fully inertial
inflation,  the stochastic  component  of the  inflationary  process  must still  be
specified.  One  possibility  is  simply  to  add  a  disturbance  term  to  equation  (14),
thus  modelling  the  rate  of inflation  as  a random  walk:
Xt . Xt-i  +  Ut  (15)
Where  ut is  a  white  noise  stochastic  process. A second  possibility  is  to
model the rate of inflation  as a local-level  model, i.e.,  a random  welk plus
noise  model (Harvey  1989). That  assumes  that  inflation  consists  of an inertial
15 The model can also be extended  in other  directions,  such as the  non-
synchronization  of  wage  adjustments  across  different  classes  of  workers,  end  the
declining  periodicity  of  wage adjustments  (Simonsen  1989).22
component,  as in equation  (15),  plus  a random  noise  (Barbosa  and  Vale 1989):
fft  +r  t  ft  (16)
ff  t'  t-1+t  (17)
Where ff  is the inertial  component  and et is a white noise stochastic
process. The  reduced  form  of the  local-level  model  is  an  ARIMA (0,1,1)  (Harvey
1989),  while the first  model is an ARIMA (0,1,0). In either  case  we will be
testing for the existence  of  unit roots in the inflation  series.  Table 6
reproduces  the results  of the  augmented  Dickey-Fuller  test (Dickey  and  Fuller,
1979  and 1981;  Dickey  et al 1986;  and  Nelson  and  Plosser  1982)  for  the  monthly
rates  of inflation  (CPI)  over  successive  sample  periods,  with the  beginning  of
the sample  fixed at January 1977.  The recursive  estimates  of the lagged
inflation  coefficient  are  shown  in figure  7.
The  results  indicate  that  during  1988  the  nature  of  the  stochastic  process
generating  the inflation  series  changed. Until 1988  the  hypothesis  of a unit
root  in  the  inflation  series  is  rejected  at  the  1  percent  level  of  significance.
At the same time,  the trend  coefficient  is quite  significant. Therefore,  the
inflation  series  seems to follow  a trend-stationary  (TS)  process  during  this
period,  as opposed  to  a difference  stationary  (DS)  process  (Nelson  and  Plosser,
1982)16.  In sum, the stochastic  nature  of the inflation  series  during  this
period  does  not suggest  the  existence  of inertia.
When the  sample  is  extended  beyond  1988,  however,  the  hypothesis  of  a  unit
root and a DS cannot be rejected.  Moreover, figure  7 indicates  that the
structural  break  started  in June 1988,  following  the  real  devaluation  of the
previous  month  and  the  maintenance  of  the  real  exchange  rate  at the  new  target.
Note  also  that  after  the  real  devaluation  of  mid-1988,  inflation  rates  stabilized
on a  higher  plateau,  while  real  wages  fell  initially  (figure  8). Such  behavior
16  The statistic  associated  with the lagged  rate  of inflation  is compared
against  the  Dickey-Fuller  tables  for  the r distribution  (where  the estimation
includes  the  constant  and  the  trend  variable). The  significance  of the  term  in
lagged  differences  is  tested  against  a standard  t-distribution.  See  also  Harvey
(1990).,23
Table  6
Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  Tests  for  the  Monthly  Rate  of Inflation
Estimated  Equations  D(dt)  - aO  +  Olt  +  a 2wt-1  +  a 3D(nt_.)  + et
AAA  A
Sample  ao  a1 82 a3
77.01-87.12  -0.01  0.0004  -0.73  -0.05
(-1.87)  (5.32)  (-6.61)  (-0.57)
77.01-88.06  -0.01  0.0004  -0.82  -0.03
(-2.09)  (5.73)  (-6.76)  (-0.29)
77.01-88.12  -0.01  0.0003  -0.52  -0.21
(-2.14)  (4.57)  (-5.44)  (-2.50)
77.01-89.06  -0.01  0.0002  -0.18  -0.40
(-1.77)  (2.69)  (-2.22)  (-4.70)
77.01-89.12  -0.01  0.0002  0.06  -0.54
(-1.0)  (1.09)  (1.20)  (-6.56)
Notess D is the  difference  operator,  D(wt)  wt f  It-i
Computed  t-statistice  in  parertheses
Fi. gure  .7
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is  consistent with  the  Pazos-Simoneen  mechanism, although inflation did
accelerate  later  on.17
Although the  acceleration  of  inflation in 1989 iG  partly  associated with
the  large  build-uo  of foreign  reserves  by the  central  bank,  the large  increase
in real wages also stands out  as a  major  cause  (figure  8)e  Note  also that such
increase  in  real  wages  was  to  a  good  extent  forward  looking--a  preemptive  action
against  the  expectation  of  a  stabilization  program  and  a  wage  freeze  (see  Helpman
and Leiderman 1990, for a model of inflation  based on forward-looking  wage
formation  and  monetary  accommodation).
Figure  8
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Two conclusions  may be drawn  from  the  analysis  above. First,  the  second
experiment  with real exchange  rate targets  had a much stronger impact  on
inflation  than the  first,  despite  the  smaller  real  devaluation. That reflects
the  relatively  low  downward  resistance  of  real  wages  in  the  early  1980s,  and  the
increased  real wage rigie  ty at the end of the decade.  Second,  the lagged
17  The  "blip"  in  the  coefficient  in  late  1987  reflects  the  real  devaluation
of that  same  period. Since  that  devaluation  was not  sustained  (figure  6), the
coefficient  declined  during  the  first  semester  of 198C.25
inflation coefficient  kept increasing  in 1989, despite the fact that wage
formation  shifted  partly  from  backward  to forward  looking. Thus,  although  the
test is capturing  the increased  importance  of these  non-fiscal  factors  at the
end  of  the  decade,  the  results  also  lend  support  to  the  observation  made  by  other
authors,  namely, that such univariate  tests are not sufficiently  strong to
differentiate  backward-looking  inertia  from a forward-looking  wage mechanism
(Helpman  and  Leiderman  1988  and 1989),18
4. Past  Stabilization  Attempts  and  the 1990  ProLram.
The failure  to correct  the  internal  imbalances  was the  main  reason  behind
the failure  of various  stabilization  attempts  in the  mid-1980s,  vhich relied
mostly  on wage-price  controls. Particularly  noteworthy  was the stabilization
attempt  of mid-1988,  which attempted  to curb inflation  through  the imposition
of progressively  declining  targets  on the growth  of money and  wages, and the
attempt to impose financial  discipline  on enterprises  through increases  in
interest  rates. To  achieve  that  purpose,  the  authorities  introduced  indexation
of time deposits  above  three  months.  No fiscal  support  to stabilization  was
envisaged  in the 1988  program.
The inconsistencies  of the  mid-1988  program  were aggravated  by a real
devaluation  (figure  6)  whose  rationale  was  unclear,  since  the  country  was  already
running  a  large  current  account  surplus  and  was  also  engaged  in  debt  rescheduling
negotiations  with private  foreign  banks. As it  happened,  the  real  devaluation
defeated  one  of the  main  purposes  of  the  external  debt  rescheduling,  which  was
to relieve  the  pressure  of external  debt  payments  on the  domestic  economy.
The  attempt  to  maintain  the  real  exchange  rate  undervalued  in the  context
of  formal  wage  indexation  resulted  in  a  strong  acceleration  of  wages  and  prices,
as shown  above.  The real devaluation  also increased  the burden of foreign
interest  payments,  thus  offsetting  in  part  the  benefits  of the  rescheduling  of
commercial  debt. The  pressure  to  finance  hidden  losses,  particularly  the  central
18  However,  Petrovic  (1990)  formulates  and  explicit  model  and  concludes  for
the  existence  of inertia  in  the  Yugoslav  inflation.26
bank'o  own  deficit,  led  policy-makers  to  abandon  the  monetary  targets  soon  after
their implementation. Faced  with higher  real  interest  rates  on bank credits
several  enterprises  simply  stopped  paying,  aggravating  considerably  the  already
severe  problem  of non-perfcsming  loans  in the  commercial  banks.
The failure of the 1988 stabilization  program  showed the futility  of
implementing  another program without addressing the  fundamental  domestic
imbalances.  Thus,  during  1989,  consensus  was  reached  about  the  need  to  generate
a  surplus  in  the  non-financial  public  sector  in  order  to  cover  losses  elsewhere
in  the  economy,  even  though  there  was  less  certainty  about  the  required  magnitude
of the  fiscal  adjustment,  or the  best strategy  to deal  with the  loss-makers.
In  the  case  of  the  central  bank's  own  deficit,  the  solution  was  clear,  and
consisted  basically in transferring  the servicing of its foreign exchange
liabilities,  and  its  credit  subsidies  to favored  sectors  to  the  federal  budget.
In the  case  of enterprises  and  commercial  banks,  the  situation  was less  clear.
Although enterprise losses where  regularly calculated,  the  magnitude of
accounting  problems  decreased  the reliance on the available  figures.  The
situation  of commercial  banks  was not fully  transparent  either. The share  of
non performing  loans was known to be large,  but the estimates  were still
tentative. In addition,  the  government  had  not  completed  the  design  of a  well-
defined  strategy  to deal  with the  loss-makers. For  instance,  there  were still
doubts  of  whether  to provide  a fiscal  subsidy  to lose-makers,  while submitting
them  to restructuring  programs  (involving  lay-offs,  debt  write-offs,  selective
improving  investments,  changes  in  management,  and  so  on),  or  whether  to let  the
Darwinian-Schumpeterian  law  of  natural  selection  operate  freely. In  this  case,
the  number  of bankruptcies  was expected  to increase  much  more rapidly,  and  the
fiscal  resources  would  be directed  towards  social  programs,  as  opposed  to loss
making  enterprises. The final  design  of the program  shows  that  policy-makers
opted  for  the second  approach.
The  stabilization  program  of 1990  (actually  launched  in  mid-December  1989)
comprised  a variety  of measures  in the areas  of incomes,  monetary,  exchange,
trade, and fiscal policies (see Coricelli  and Rocha 1991 for much greater27
detail).  The program  also included  a 60-day  tolerance  limit for enterprise
arrears,  as a  device  to force inefficient  enterprises  into bankruptcy.  The
government could implement this measure due  to the  existence of  a  very
centralized  system of payments in Yugoslavia,  and it was announced  as one
component  of a  future  comprehensive  program  of restructuring  and  privatization
of banks  and  enterprises.
Incomes  policy  comprised  a 6-month  freeze  in the  exchange  rate,  nominal
wages,  and a set of public  sector  prices  accounting  to 20 percent  of the  CPI.
The exchange  rate  freeze  was later  extended  to 1  year.  The  exchange  rate and
public  sector  prices  were frozen  after  a series  of adjustments  in late 1989.
However,  the devaluations  that  preceded  the freeze  were rapidly  eroded  by the
increase  in  prices  that  followed  the  implementation  of the  program,  as shown  in
figure  6.
Monetary  policy  consisted  basically  of a freeze  in the  nominal  stock  of
the central bank's  net domestic  assets,  while allowing  the central  bank to
monetize  foreign  exchange  inflows.  The exchange  and trade  policy  components
comprised  a substantial  relaxation  of trade  controls  and the introduction  of
currency  convertibility.
Fiscal  policy, a critical  component  of the program,  consisted of an
expected  fiscal  adjustment  of 5 percent  of GSP designed  to cover the central
bank's  deficit,  to  support  a  banking  restructuring  program,  to finance  a  social
program,  and  to  cover  some  enterprise  arrears. The  envisaged  increase  in  fiscal
revenues  was expected  to come  partly  from  exogenous  increases  in taxation  (3.5
percent  of GSP) and  partly  from  the  inverse  Tanzi-Olivera  effect  (1.5  percent)
(see  Olivera  1967;  Tanzi  1977).
The stabilization  program  of January  1990  achieved  a sharp  reduction  in
the rate of inflation  during  the first  semester  of 1990  without recourse  to
widespread  price  controls. As shown  in figure  9, monthly  rates  of inflation
(retail  prices)  were reduced  from  60  percent  in  December  1989  to almost  zero  in
May  and  June. A slowdown  of economic  activity  also  followed  the  implementation
of  the  program,  as indicated  by  the 10  percent  decline  in industrial  production28
during  1990.  However,  such a decline  in activity  had already  started  in the
second half  of  1989  (figure 9),  and  cannot be  blamed entirely on  the
stabilization.
There are  no indications  that  monetary  policy  was unduly  restrictive  in
the  first  semester. Indeed,  a large  repatriation  of foreign  assets  held  abroad
by exporting  enterprises,  and  increased  workers'  remittances  resulted  in  a  US$3
billion  increase  in  reserves  in  the  first  semester. That,  in turn,  resulted  in
a  large  increase  in  the  real  stocks  of  base  money  and  Ml  during  the  same  period.
In addition,  the  December  monetary  and  credit  "blips"  (figure  9) also suggest
that  liquidity  conditions  were not excessively  restrictive  at the  start  of the
program*
Even  though  monetary  policy  did  not  appear  excessively  restrictive,  a  large
number  of  enterprises experienced severe difficulties in  meeting  their
obligations  during  the  first  semester,  revealing  their  high  degree  of  dependency
on bank credits.  Out of 25,000  enterprises  in the socialized  sector,  7,000
enterprises  had fallen  behind  their  obligations  by at least  one  day, 3,000  had
accumulated  arrears  for  30  days  and  350  were  declared  bankrupt9  for  having  failed
to meet payments  for  60 days.  A large  number  of enterprises  interrupted  wage
payments  in  May, in order  to postpone  bankruptcy. The situation  at the  end  of
the first semester  was very differentiated,  with one group of enterprises
increasing  wages above the ceiling,  and another group unable to make wage
payments  within  the  ceiling.
Pressures  to relax  monetary  and  credit  policies  mounted  during  the  first
semester,  leading  effectively  to  a relaxation  at  the  end  of the  semester. Bank
credits  started  growing  very strongly  after  June,  leading  to further  increases
in  wages and  finally  to an increase  in the  rate  of inflation  to levels  above  8
percent  in  September  and  October  (figure  9).  The  relaxation  of  monetary  policy
also  aborted  the  expected  shake-out  of the industrial  sector,  by keeping  loss
making  enterprises  afloat,  while  also  allowing  them  to resume  wage payments.
Concern  over the  revival  of inflation  led  the  central  bank  to shift  back
to a  restrictive  monetary  policy  in early  October. However,  pressed  by
enterprises  'o continue  lending,  the  banks  avoided  a  contraction  of credit  by
not  complying  with  reserve  requirements.  The  last  indication  of  the  difficulties0  ~~~~~~m 3  x~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1
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the central  bank faced in conducting  monetary  policy  was a  bizarre  episode  in
December  1990,  when one  of the  regional  branches  of the  central  bank increased
credits  by  US$1.8  billion  equivalent  of dinars,  without  prior  notification  to
the  board  of governors,  in order  to finance  lose  making  enterprises,  pensions,
and  agricultural  subsidies  (The  Economist,  January  12,  1991).
The expansion in central  bank credits did not result in a monetary
expansion  because  of  the  large  loss  of  foreign  reserves  that  happened  in  the  same
period  (more  than  US$ 3 billion  in the  last  quarter). In fact,  the  situation
in the last  quarter  was exactly  the  reverse  of the first  quarter,  involving  an
expansion  of  domestic  credits,  a fall  of foreign  reserves  and  a  nearly  constant
stock  of  M1 (figure  9). Although  the  open  current  and  capital  accounts  prevented
a further acceleration  of inflation  at the end of 1990,  these episodes  of
monetary  decontrol  and the large  loss  of reserves  raised  obvious  doubts  about
the  sustainability  of the  stabilization  program.
The  recognition  that  the  exchange  rate  had  become  severely  appreciated  led
to a  corrective  30 percent  devaluation  on January 1, 1991,  as well as a  the
suspension  of convertibility.  These  measures  were  unavoidable,  given  the  large
loss  of reserves  at the  end  oE 1990. However,  they  also led  to an increase  in
inflation  in  early  199L  (5  and  10  percent  in  January  and  February,  respectively),
despite  the  reimposition  of  wage controls  and  efforts  to reassert  control  over
monetary  policy. Moreover,  the  erosion  of  the  first  devaluation  led  to  a  second
corrective  devaluation  of 45 percent  in April 1991.  Therefore,  the challenge
faced  by policy-makers  in 1991  is to  obtain  the  countrywide  consensus  that  will
allow  the  continuous  enforcement  of  wage,  monetary  and fiscal  policies  which  is
required  to prevent  the  reemergence  of an exchange  rate-wages-prices  spiral.
5. Conclusions
The  paper  had two  main objectives. First,  to examine  the  main causes  of
the acceleration  of inflation  in Yugoslavia  during  the 1980s  and, second,  to
review past and current attempts  at stabilization. The paper showed that
inflation  in Yugoslavia  shares  common  elements  with inflation  in other  high
indebted  countries,  despite  initial  appearances  pointing  otherwise. The  common
elements  are a large  transfer  of resources  abroad  not  matched  by an internal31
adjustment,  and  resulting  in a  large  internal  redistribution  of real resources
through  inflation. Yugoslavia  seems  to  differ  from  other  cases  due  to the  lack
of  transparency  of  internal  conditions.  Instead  of  an  open  fiscal  deficit,  there
were complex  interactions  among  enterprises,  commercial  banks  and the  central
bank, involving,  among other  things,  the absorption  and servicing  of a large
stock  of foreign  exchange  liabilities  by the  latter. The  paper  also  showed  how
other  factors  contributed  to the  sharp  acceleration  of inflation  at the  end  of
the decade.  More specifically,  a  large  real devaluation  in mid-1988  in the
context  of an indexed  economy  drove  inflation  to a  much  higher  plateau. During
1989,  a  preemptive  explosion  of  real  wages  became  a  major  factor  of  acceleration
of inflation.
The paper argued  that the failure  to correct  the hidden losses  in the
econory was  the main  cause of  the  failure of  the various attempts at
stabilization  in  the  1980s. The  1990  program  vas  the  first  program  to  recognize
the existence  of hidden  losses  and the  need for  a fiscal  correction,  although
it  also  introduced  other  elements  to  cope  with  inflationary  inertia.  The  program
succeeded  in  elimitnating  the  central  bank's  own  deficit,  and  had  initial  success
in  halting  inflation. However,  it  became  clear  during  the  course  of 1990  that
other  losses  had not  been  removed. Pressures  to finance  enterprises  and  avoid
a  liquidity  crisis  in  the  financial  system  resulted  in  a  relaxation  of  monetary
policy in mid-1990 and a  revival of inflationary  pressures in the second
semester. Attempts  to reimpose  monetary  control  met considerable  difficulties
at  the  end  of  the  year,  including  a  bizarre  episode  of  expansion  of  central  bank
credits  without  approval  by the  board  of governors.
It became  also  clear  that  the fiscal  component  was not consistent  with
other  elements  of the program. In particular,  it  was clearly  insufficient  to
finance  a  social  program  of  the  magnitude  that  would  be  required,  had  loss  making
enterprises  really  been forced  into  bankruptcy,  and  also to  cover  the  needs  of
the  banking  restructuring  program. Seen  from  this angle,  the  Yugoslav  program
of 1990  resembles  other  heterodox  programs  that  had  initial  success  in  reducing
inflation,  but  later  faltered  due  to  the  insufficiency  of  the  fiscal  adjustment.
At  the  same  time,  the  events  in  the  second  half  of 1990  also  indicate  that,
for  a  stabilization  program  to  succeed  in  Yugoslavia,  there  must  be  much  greater32
political  resolve  in  dealing  vith  wage indiscipline  and  loss  making  enterprises
than vas observed  during  the  course  of 1990.  It also  brings  the question  of
whether financial  discipline  can really  be imposed  in the system  only at the
macroeconomic  level, and without the introduction  of private ownership of
capital.  This  finally  brin8s  us the  related  question  of  whether  stabilization
in Yugoslavia can  ultimately succeed in  the  absence of  a  comprehensive
privatization  program.33
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